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abstract
This research used Protection Motivation Theory
to examine if and how individuals who experience a
near-miss wildfire event (i.e., a recent, proximal wildfire
that did not harm these individuals or their properties)
intend to protect themselves against future risks.

Response efficacy was a significant predictor of four
pre-416 and two post-fire mitigation actions, and selfefficacy was a significant predictor of two post-416
mitigation actions. Further, significant differences exist
for all pre-416 and post-416 mitigation actions which
shows the impact that the fire had on respondent
intentions to mitigate for future wildfire risks.

We administered a drop-off pick-up survey to
residents living in Durango, Colorado, a community
heavily impacted by the 416 fire in the spring and
summer of 2018. The survey, completed by 195
residents, solicited information about wildfire
mitigation behaviors taken before and after the
416 fire. Data were also collected on four of the
dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory which
may influence individuals’ willingness to mitigate
future wildfire risks.

This research contributed to the broader literature by
identifying how perceptions and mitigation behaviors
change after experiencing a near-miss wildfire event,
and to local wildfire management efforts by providing
insights into specific mitigation actions to incentivize
through local assistance programs.

Figure 1. View of the 416 fire in La Plata County.
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Introduction
property from a given threat (Figure 2; Bubeck, Botzen
& Aerts, 2012).

Wildfires are increasing in frequency and severity
across the West. Additionally, a growing number of
people are living in at-risk wildland urban interface
areas (Radeloff et al., 2018). With greater proportions
of the population being exposed to the risk of more
probable wildfires, federal, state, and local land
managers need to understand how homeowners
prepare for and respond to wildfire risks. Despite the
fact that social scientists have made substantial efforts
to better understand homeowners’ risk perceptions
and their preparedness behaviors in anticipation
of future wildfires, little is known about how risk
perceptions and mitigation behaviors change in
response to experiencing a near-miss wildfire event
(Dupéy & Smith, 2018; McCaffrey & Olsen, 2012;
McCaffrey, Toman, Stidham, & Shindler, 2013; Toman,
Stidham, McCaffrey, & Shindler, 2013).

Figure 2. The appraisal processes and associated dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory.
Threat appraisals involve individuals identifying how
bad the consequences of a threat will be (perceived
severity) and estimating the probability of that threat
occurring (perceived vulnerability). Next, coping
appraisals involve individuals’ belief that a specific
mitigation action will reduce future risks (response
efficacy), their assessment of their capacity to carry
out the action (self-efficacy), and their estimate of
how much will it cost (in time, money labor, etc.) to
implement the action (response costs) (Bubeck, Botzen
& Aerts, 2012). Results from the combination of
these two appraisals helps predict if an individual will
engage in a protective or maladaptive (non-protective)
response to a threat (Figure 2).

Previous research has found an increase in individuals’
preparedness immediately following a natural hazard
event (Russell, Goltz & Bourque, 1995). Surveying
residents in the months following a wildfire can
provide a deeper understanding of how experience
with wildfire shapes individuals’ risk perceptions
associated with future wildfires, and their behavioral
intentions to lower vulnerability to the risks associated
with future fires. Further, near-miss events describe
avoided disasters which have the potential to result
in extreme damage (e.g., loss or life or property).
Near-miss events can provide a false sense of security
to individuals. Research on near-miss events in the
context of hurricanes has shown that individuals
who experience near-miss events are likely to have
perceptions that reflect this ‘missed’ experience; they
are likely to believe and make subsequent decisions
on the idea that the situation is less risky (Dillon &
Tinsley, 2016; Dillon, Tinsley, & Cronin, 2011). Nearmiss wildfire events in the wildland-urban interface
have not been empirically examined despite the fact
that these individuals are likely to perceive and make
decisions based on this ‘missed’ experience. This
study uses Protection Motivation Theory to better
understand how wildland-urban interface residents
that have experienced a near-miss wildfire event
perceive future risks and whether or not they intend
to implement mitigation actions that will reduce this
future risk. Protection Motivation Theory suggests
two processes – threat and coping appraisals – shape
individuals’ decision to protect themselves and their
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This study was guided by two general research
questions:
1. Which, if any, dimension of Protection Motivation
Theory was the best predictor of wildfire mitigation
behaviors?
2. Does a recent, proximal, wildfire influence residents’
perceptions or self-reported mitigation behaviors?

Background on the 416 wildfire
The 416 wildfire (Figure 4) was identified by tracking
active wildfires throughout the 2018 fire season using
InciWeb data (InciWeb, n.d.). This database provides
detailed information (e.g., location, date, anticipated
containment date, size, weather concerns, projected
fire activity) on active wildfires. The 416 wildfire
in La Plata County, Colorado was selected due to
meeting our fire selection criteria [it exceeded 8,000
ha (~20,000 acres) pre-containment, involved the
evacuation of at least 100 residents, had wildland
urban interface and intermix areas within 6 kilometers
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(~10 miles), and had an anticipated containment date
of 8/1/2018]. The 416 wildfire started on Friday June
1, 2018 around 10:02 a.m. approximately 6 kilometers
(~10 miles) north of Durango, Colorado. The cause
of the fire is still unknown, however there are strong
accusations and lawsuits against the Durango &
Silverton Narrow Gauge Railroad as the ignition source
(Romeo, 2018). The 416 wildfire blazed through
approximately 21,613 ha (83 mi2) of U.S. Forest Service
land and 292 ha (1.1 mi2) of private land consisting of
brush (< 0.5 m; < 2.0 ft), timber (grass and understory),
and timber (litter and understory) fuels.

in evacuating residents. Many residents in the Animas
Valley evacuated from their homes, and a number of
them were exposed to fire related risks (e.g., smoke,
limited evacuation routes, immediate proximity to fire).
The proximity of the 416 wildfire and the location of
residents allowed us to collect data on individuals who
were more likely to respond to wildfire in a protective
manner, compared to those who experienced a similar
fire but were more than a 1.0 km from the perimeter,
or only impacted by smoke.

methods

The location of the 416 wildfire and nearby residents
provided a unique opportunity to understand how
residents protected themselves prior to, and plan
to protect themselves following a recent, proximal
fire. The 416 wildfire placed a direct threat on the
residents in the Animas Valley along Highway 550,
where the wildland urban interface and intermix is
present. The fire perimeter encroached on interface
and intermix residents on the west side of the valley.
The valley is narrow, with one main entrance to the
north and one to the south. This can present difficulty

Survey procedures
Spatial data for the 416 wildfire, evacuation zone, and
parcel data from La Plata County were compiled to
identify all residents near the eastern burn perimeter.
We sampled both individuals that were and were not
evacuated, and spatial boundaries were identified to
only sample residents who were within the northern
and southern ends of the 416 evacuation zone. We
excluded parcels with two addresses (indicating
the parcel was a second home), condominiums,

Figure 3. View of the 416 burn perimeter from one survey respondent’s property.
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Baxter & Lamiman, 1999). To achieve the highest
response rate possible, we utilized the drop-off/pickup method with the option to mail the survey back
in a pre-paid envelope. Surveys were administered
in person by three research assistants, one of whom
was the lead author on this report. We knocked on
each door selected from the random sample and
asked for the person in charge of yard and house
maintenance to complete the survey. Asking the head
of the household to fill the survey out in person can
increase response rates by approximately 10 to 37%
compared to other methods (i.e., handing the survey to
whomever answers the door, or leaving the survey on
the doorknob with no face-to-face contact) (Melevin,
Dillman, Baxter & Lamiman, 1999). The surveys were
administered between November 7 and November 21,
2018.
Survey design
The drop-off/pick-up survey was designed to measure
each of the processes described in the Protection
Motivation Theory literature (Table 1). Protection
Motivation Theory posits that two cognitive appraisals
(threat and coping appraisals) shape the decision
to protect one’s self from a given threat (Bubeck,
Botzen & Aerts, 2012). Threat appraisals includes
two dimensions: 1) perceived severity (How bad the
consequences of a threat will be) and 2) perceived
vulnerability (the probability of a threat occurring).
Coping appraisals includes three dimensions: 1)
response efficacy (belief that the mitigation action
taken will reduce risk); 2) self-efficacy (belief in one’s
capacity to carry out the action); and 3) the response
costs (how much will it cost to implement the action)
(Bubeck, Botzen & Aerts, 2012). Due to the crosssectional nature of our study, we were not able to ask
about all dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory
both before and after the 416 wildfire. Perceived
severity before the 416 fire was elicited by asking
residents to estimate their level of concern about
wildfire prior to fire. For both perceived severity and
response efficacy, we asked respondents to estimate
their beliefs prior to the fire as well as at the time
they were surveyed (i.e., post-fire). Self-efficacy
and response costs were only measured at the time
residents were surveyed. Each dimension, along with
its specific measure and temporal reference is shown
in Table 1.

Figure 4. The 416 wildfire burn perimeter (red
polygon) and all residences that were included in the
sample for this study (green dots).
apartments, and other rental properties, since these
individuals likely are not able to engage in wildfire
mitigation on their property. All residents within these
geographic and sampling boundaries were included
as potential survey respondents. We used a random
number generator to extract 500 parcels based on a
geospatial ID number into a sampling list. The sampled
parcels were mapped to maximize travel time between
parcels during the drop-off/pick-up survey effort. Once
in the field it was apparent that parcels in the northern
valley were secondary and vacation homes with little
to no current occupancy, thus, these parcels were
excluded from sampling. To account for this loss, we
randomly re-sampled the remaining southern parcels
to reach the desired sample size (n = 500).
Previous research has shown substantially higher
average response rates for drop-off/pick-up surveys
when compared to traditional mail surveys (Lovelock,
Stiff, Cullwick & Kaufman, 1976; Melevin, Dillman,

416 Fire Report 2019

In addition to the measures of the five dimensions of
Protection Motivation Theory, the survey included
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Table 1. Appraisal processes, dimensions, definitions and drop-off pick-up survey
questions associated with Protection Motivation Theory.

questions to provide context on: awareness of and
participation in local mitigation programs, barriers
to previous and intended wildfire mitigation, and
evacuation experiences. The survey tested if and
which dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory
influenced past or future mitigation behaviors.
Collectively, the drop-off/pick-up survey collected data
on:

•
•
•
•
•

Additional descriptive analyses provide a broad
overview of evacuation experiences, awareness of and
participation in local mitigation programs, and barriers
to mitigation across all survey respondents.
Research question 1
To answer research question 1 (Which, if any, facet
of Protection Motivation Theory is the best predictor
of wildfire mitigation behaviors?) we used a series
of eighteen binary logistic regression models. The
dependent variables in these models were the nine
mitigation behaviors residents could have taken, or
could take in the future, to reduce their wildfire risk.
We asked about residents’ behaviors both before and
after the 416 fire, creating a total of 18 behavioral
measures. We regressed each behavior on the
appropriate set of measures corresponding to each of
the dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory.

All five dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory
related to wildfire events in the Animas Valley.
Mitigation behaviors taken before and after the 416
fire;
Barriers to implementing mitigation behaviors prior to
and after the fire;
Experiences with the evacuation that occurred during
the fire; and
Respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics.

Research question 2
To answer research question 2 (Does a recent,
proximal, wildfire influence resident perceptions or
self-reported mitigation behaviors?) we compared
respondents’ perceived vulnerability and wildfire
mitigation actions pre- and post-416 fire and ran Chisquare tests to test for significance between pre- and
post-416 fire mitigation behaviors.

Data analysis
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive analyses investigated standard
sociodemographic information (e.g., gender, education,
income), and non-traditional demographic information
that may lead to insights on what these individuals
are protecting (e.g., children, livestock, pets). These
results were compiled to provide sociodemographic
information on the respondents in this survey.
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results

Table 2. The age, gender, education and income level
of 416 fire survey respondents.

Descriptive analysis
In total, 500 surveys were delivered to residents
within the pre-evacuation and evacuation zones. Of
those, two residents (0.4%) declined to participate,
204 (40.8%) were face-to-face deliveries and 294
(58.8%) were left on the door knob. A total of 195
usable surveys were returned for a total response
rate of 39%. We did not conduct any tests for nonresponse bias given the response rate was more than
acceptable for public opinion research (Dillman, Smyth
& Christian, 2008).
To describe our respondents, we separated them
into short- and long- term based on research that
designates 10 or more years as ‘long-term’ (Hunter,
Boardman & Onge, 2005). We had nearly equal
responses from short-term (49%) and long-term (51%)
residents. Additionally, the overwhelming majority
(94%) of respondents were primary residents (i.e., the
parcel was not a vacation home or second home). We
also had nearly equal responses from males (54%) and
females (45%) (Table 2). Over 75% were born between
1930 and 1970 and nearly half were retired (48%).
Those who were still employed held a number of jobs,
such as: carpenter, civil engineer, chef, mechanic,
professor, restaurant owner, ski instructor, truck driver,
and writer. Our respondents were well educated;
nearly 80% had a bachelors, masters, doctoral, or
professional degree. They were also fairly affluent; the
average annual household income was $131,176 with
less than 10% having an annual household income
under $40,000.

(25.7%), and turning off propane or moving gas tanks
from the house (24.8%). Some residents (<10%)
cleared brush from next to the house, left lights on,
left notes or signs for firefighters, shut their windows
and vents. Finally, we asked respondents who were
evacuated to indicate how far they had to travel to
get to their temporary evacuation location. Distances
ranged from 1.6 kilometers (1 mile) to 1600 kilometers
(1000 miles), with an average distance of 74 miles.

Evacuation experiences
We asked three questions to better understand the
evacuation experiences of respondents. First, we
identified the number of respondents who were on
mandatory evacuation (39.8%) the number who were
on pre-evacuation but still chose to evacuate (8.2%),
and the number who did not evacuate (50%). We
asked those who evacuated (by choice or mandate) to
indicate any ‘last minute’ actions they took to protect
their home or property. Approximately 71% indicated
they implemented at least one protective measure
prior to evacuation. The most common protective
actions included moving flammable or combustible
material from the deck or around the house (30.5%),
leaving water buckets and/or hoses out for firefighters
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Awareness of and participation in local wildfire
mitigation programs
We also asked a series of questions to understand if
respondents were aware of local wildfire mitigation
programs, whether or not they participated, and the
reasons why they chose not to participate. Overall,
approximately 40% of respondents were aware of
these programs (n = 83) and nearly 16% participated in
a mitigation program within the last year (n = 31). The
most common response was participating in FireWise

9

certification or being part of a FireWise community
(61.3%).
Of the respondents who did not participate in a
mitigation program within the last year, about 60%
provided an explanation as to why (n = 70). The most
common reasons were that respondents: engaged in
mitigation themselves (n = 25); didn’t believe they
lived in an area that required mitigation (n= 19); were
unaware of these programs (n = 14); monetary costs or
time (n = 3); or they didn’t think their home or property
would be threatened (n = 2).
Barriers to wildfire mitigation
To better understand what hinders wildfire mitigation,
we asked respondents to indicate barriers they faced
prior to the 416 fire, and barriers they anticipate facing
in the 2019 fire season. Prior to the 416 wildfire the
most common barriers were a lack of time (38.6%), not
enough help with the tasks (27.9%), and other financial
obligations (26.9%). Following the 416 wildfire
respondents still perceived a lack of time (15.3%) and/
or help with the tasks (13.3%) as the main barriers
with the inclusion of potential health issues or illness
(11.9%) as an additional barrier to mitigating risk (Table
3). This increase in potential health issues or illness
could be due to the average age of respondents; over
75% are over the age of 49. These results can shed
light on how to navigate assistance programs in the
2019 fire season based on specific resident needs and
identified trends in barriers to wildfire mitigation.
In addition, respondents were asked to describe any
additional barriers they faced in mitigating risk prior to
the 416 wildfire and barriers they anticipate during the
upcoming 2019 fire season. In total, 32 respondents
mentioned additional barriers prior to the 416 wildfire
(n = 9) or perceived future barriers (n = 23) such
as: neighbors brush creeping onto their property,
homeowners’ associations, enjoying the natural look,
their residence is a rental, not being able to financially

Figure 5. One of many local businesses showing support for the firefighters who saved houses and businesses from the 416 fire.
afford mitigation, or being absent prior to the 416
ignition. After answering questions about perceived
future barriers to wildfire mitigation, respondents were
asked ‘Considering all of the costs associated with
protecting your home and property from wildfire risk
(labor, time, money), do you think the costs are worth
the benefits?’ Nearly 90% said the costs are worth the
benefits, approximately 9% were unsure, and less than
2% said the costs are not worth the benefits.
Dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory
Perceived severity. Perceived severity was measured
by asking, ‘When you first heard about the 416 fire
did you think it would grow large enough to threaten
residential areas?’ Most respondents (80%) thought it
was somewhat or very likely, 12% thought it was not
very or somewhat unlikely, and 8% were unsure.

Table 3. Self-reported barriers to engage in wildfire mitigation
prior to and following the 416 wildfire.
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Table 4. Pre- and post-fire perceptions of the
likelihood a wildfire could start in Animas Valley.

on property (73.5%); and thinning and pruning trees
and shrubs within 30 feet of their home (73.3%).
Self-efficacy. To measure self-efficacy, respondents
were asked if they believed they could undertake all
of the mitigation actions they intended to take before
the 2019 fire season. Nearly 80% believed they could,
approximately 7% did not believe they could, and
9% were unsure if they could undertake all of the
mitigation actions planned for 2019. The remaining 5%
did not have wildfire mitigation planned for 2019 or
did not provide a response (1.5%).

Perceived vulnerability. To measure residents’
perceptions of vulnerability to wildfire prior to and
after the 416 fire we asked two questions: 1) ‘Before
the 416 wildfire, how likely did you think it was that
a wildfire could start in Animas Valley?’, and 2) ‘How
likely do you think it is that a wildfire could start in
Animas Valley next year?’ Prior to the 416 wildfire
most respondents (88.3%) believed it was somewhat
or very likely (Table 4) that a wildfire could happen in
Animas Valley. However, after the 416 wildfire only
68.9% believed a wildfire was somewhat or very likely
to happen in Animas Valley in 2019 (Table 4).

Response costs. To measure response costs after
experiencing the 416 fire, one question asked
respondents to indicate if they believed all of the costs
associated with protecting their home and property
from wildfire risk (e.g., labor, time, money) are worth
the benefits. Most respondents (86.7%) stated that the
costs were worth the benefits, less than 2% said they
were not, and just under 10% were unsure.

Response efficacy. To understand how individuals’
perceptions of the effectiveness of mitigation actions
changed after experiencing the 416 fire we asked
respondents to indicate how much they believed
each mitigation action we asked about would
reduce their risk of future wildfire damage. After
experiencing the 416 fire, most respondents agreed
that three mitigation behaviors had a moderate or
major reduction to their future wildfire risk (Table 5).
These actions included moving firewood and other
combustibles 30 feet from the structures on their
property (77%); disposing of dead fuel accumulation

Research Question 1: Which, if any, dimension of
Protection Motivation Theory was the best predictor of
wildfire mitigation behaviors?
To answer research question 1, we constructed and
ran 9 pre-416 fire and 9 post-416 fire binary logistic
regression models (18 total). Each mitigation behavior
was regressed on three appropriate dimensions of
Protection Motivation Theory (Table 1). The prefire model used 9 mitigation behaviors residents
could have taken prior to the 416 fire as dependent
variables. The independent variables were perceived
severity, perceived vulnerability, and response efficacy.

Table 5. Level of perceived response efficacy for each mitigation behavior after experiencing the 416 wildfire.
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Of the three independent variables, only response
efficacy was a significant predictor of pre-416 fire
mitigation behaviors (Table 6). More specifically,
response efficacy was significantly and positively
related to: 1) creating a written or verbal plan for
future evacuations; 2) packing an evacuation bag
to keep in case of an emergency; 3) signing up for
emergency text alerts; 4) screening in attics, roofs,
eaves, and foundation vents; and 5) moving firewood
and other combustibles 30 feet from structures (Table
6).

property. Self-efficacy was a significant predictor of
the intention to screen in attics, roofs, eaves, and
foundation vents and thinning and pruning trees and
shrubs within 30 feet of the home (Table 7).
Research Question 2: Does a recent, proximal, wildfire
influence residents’ perceptions or self-reported
mitigation behaviors?
To answer this question we compared respondents’
perceptions of the likelihood of a wildfire occurring
in the area pre- and post-416 fire. Prior to the fire
most respondents (88.3%) believed it was somewhat
or very likely, however, after the fire only 68.9%
believed a wildfire was somewhat or very likely to
happen in Animas Valley in 2019 (Table 4). These data
reveal a 20% reduction in resident perceptions of
the likeliness that a wildfire could happen in Animas
Valley after experiencing a recent fire. These results
support previous work showing dampened risk
perceptions after experiencing a recent, proximal
wildfire (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel,
Goble, Kasperson & Ratick, 1988; McGee, McFarlane
& Varghese, 2009) or other natural hazard (Dillon,
Tinsley & Burns, 2014; Dillon, Tinsley & Cronin, 2011;
Dillon, Tinsley & Cronin, 2011). Interestingly, more

The post-fire models used the same 9 mitigation
behaviors (Table 7) that residents can implement
to reduce their risk during future fire seasons. The
independent variables for the post-416 wildfire
model were perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy,
and response efficacy. Response efficacy and selfefficacy (i.e., belief in one’s capacity to carry out
specified actions) were both significant predictors
of four intended mitigation behaviors (Table 7).
Response efficacy was a significant predictor of
the intention to pack an evacuation bag to keep
in case of an emergency and moving firewood and
other combustibles 30 feet from structures on the

Table 6. Binary logistic regression results for pre-416 fire mitigation actions and
associated dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory (predictors).
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Table 7. Binary logistic regression results for post-416 fire mitigation actions and
associated dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory (predictors).

Figure 6. Cars lined up to leave Durango during the evacuation.
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respondents were unsure (17.9%) of how likely a
wildfire could happen in Animas Valley after the 416
wildfire, as compared to the number that were unsure
prior to the fire (4.1%; Table 4). More respondents
are uncertain of the likelihood of a wildfire in the
upcoming year after experiencing a recent, proximal
wildfire. Collectively, these results show that
experiencing a near-miss wildfire event decreases
the perceived likelihood of a wildfire event (perceived
risk) within the next year, as well as an increase in
uncertainty about this likelihood.

personal preparedness measures in the case of an
evacuation (e.g., create an evacuation plan, pack an
emergency evacuation bag) as well as structural and
vegetative mitigation (e.g., removing flammable debris,
dispose of dead fuel accumulation).

Discussion

We also compared respondents’ implemented
(pre-416 fire) and intended (post-416) mitigation
actions. Respondents were asked to indicate which
(if any) mitigation actions they engaged in prior
to and which (if any) they plan to engage in after
experiencing the 416 wildfire (Table 8). Prior to the
416 wildfire, respondents mostly disposed of dead fuel
accumulation on their property (60.9%); signed up for
emergency text (or other) alerts (59.2%); or cleared
the roof, deck, and gutters of pine needles and other
flammable debris (58.4%). After the 416 wildfire our
respondents are still likely to sign up for emergency
text or other alerts (84.0%) or dispose of dead fuel
accumulation on their property (78.1%). However,
residents were more likely to remove flammable debris
from foundation of home and deck (75.0%) (Table 4).
The most significant increases in planned mitigation
behaviors are: signing up for emergency text or other
alerts (24.8% increase); creating a written or verbal
plan for future evacuations (21.1%); and packing
an evacuation bag to keep in case of an emergency
(19.5%). These results indicate that experiences with
the 416 wildfire pushed residents to engage in more

Response efficacy of mitigation actions increased and
barriers to mitigation decreased after experiencing the
416 fire
Results from this study show that individuals are
perceiving structural and vegetative mitigation
actions as being more effective at reducing their risk
after experiencing a recent, proximal wildfire. To our
knowledge the 416 fire did not damage any homes
or residential structures, which means individuals do
not need to directly experience wildfire damage to
view mitigation as effective in preventing damage.
This could be related to what previous authors refer
to as a ‘post-exposure wake-up call’. This happens
when individuals are exposed to a hazard which leads
to a greater awareness of the risk and a desire to take
proactive measures to mitigate future exposure (Arvai,
Gregory, Ohlson, Blackwell & Gray, 2006). These
results suggest that exposure to the 416 fire brought
awareness to residents of the types of wildfires they
could experience in the future, as well as served as
a ‘wake-up call’ to view mitigation actions as more
efficient and potentially continue to engage in the
on-going vegetative actions. The three mitigation
behaviors that had the most substantial increases
(moving firewood and other combustibles 30 ft. from

Table 8. Mitigation increases pre- and post-fire. The top 3 pre- and post- 416 wildfire mitigation
actions and the largest increases are highlighted in red.
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mentioned above, experiencing the 416 fire may have
demonstrated the level of risk that exists for Animas
Valley residents and in turn, made mitigation behaviors
seem like a small task to reduce their overall risk.
Further, residents may be viewing this as a near-miss
that almost happened, which previous authors have
identified as encouraging mitigation and preparedness
(Tinsley, Dillon & Cronin, 2012). Future work should
incorporate survey questions that determine whether
residents view the near-miss event as one that was
avoided (which leads to more risky behavior) or as
an event that could have happened (which increases
mitigation and preparedness). This information would
help further predict the likelihood that individuals will
engage in future wildfire mitigation to reduce their
overall level of risk.

Figure 7. Sign found on a local resident’s garage in
Durango.
structures; disposing of dead fuel accumulation; thin
and prune trees and shrubs within 30 ft. of home)
are vegetative actions suggested by the Colorado
State Forest Service (C.S.F.S., 2019), and the National
Wildfire Coordinating Group (2006). It is promising
to see that more individuals are planning to engage
in mitigation actions that are recognized by many
institutions as contributing to risk reduction of
structures and properties. An increased belief that
these mitigation actions are effective at reducing
wildfire risk may motivate individuals to continue
engaging in these actions to keep their future level of
risk low.

Significant differences and predictors of wildfire
mitigation behavior
Overall, significant differences were found for
all pre-416 and post-416 fire mitigation behaviors.
It appears that residents in Animas Valley have been
motivated to take action after experiencing the
nearby 416 fire. This ties to the broader literature
on how experience is defined and how it shapes risk
perceptions and behavior. In this study, experience
could be defined as: evacuation status; dealing with
smoke, debris flows or flooding after the fire. Future
studies should include these post-fire experiences
into survey design to understand if there are specific
aspects of a wildfire experience that are influencing
intention to mitigate future wildfire risks.

Prior to the 416 fire, between 15% and 40% of
respondents were experiencing mental, physical, or
financial barriers to completing wildfire mitigation
actions to their home or property. After the 416 fire,
only 8 to 13% of respondents perceive experiencing
the aforementioned barriers in the upcoming fire
season. This equates to a 40% to 52% reduction in
perceived barriers after experiencing the 416 fire. As

Figure 8. Sign on a local resident’s property located on Highway 550.

416 Fire Report 2019

15

Response efficacy (i.e., belief that the specific action
will be effective in reducing risk) was a significant
predictor of five pre-416 fire and two post-416 fire
mitigation actions (seven total). However, it was not
a significant predictor of: clearing the roof, deck, and
gutters of pine needles and other debris; removing
flammable debris from the foundation of home or
deck, disposing of dead fuel accumulation on the
property, or thinning and pruning trees and shrubs
within 30 ft. of the home (Table 6). This means that
respondents view these actions as less effective or
ineffective at reducing their risk to wildfire damage.
Interestingly, all of these actions are included in the
Defensible Space Checklist (C.S.F.S., 2019) as actions
that lower risk to wildfire. Since response efficacy
was a significant predictor of other mitigation actions
on this checklist, future efforts should be made to
emphasize the effectiveness of these actions. Research
shows that it is more likely that a burning ember that
lands on a home or property ahead of the flame front
is more likely to result in ignition and destruction
(Protecting your home from a wildland fire, 2016).
Consequently, engaging in all of the nonsignificant
mitigation actions (e.g., clearing flammable debris
from the roof, deck, gutters, and foundation of home
or deck; disposing of dead fuel accumulation; and
thinning and pruning trees and shrubs within 30 ft.
of the home) would directly result in lowered risk
to wildfire. Future education and outreach should
emphasize how effective these mitigation actions are
at reducing structural and vegetative wildfire risk in
the wildland urban interface.
Self-efficacy (i.e., belief in one’s ability to
carry out specific actions) was a significant predictor
of two post-416 fire mitigation behaviors: screening
in the attic, roof, eaves and foundation vents; and
thinning and pruning shrubs within 30 feet of the
home. However, it was not a significant predictor of
the intention to: create a written or verbal plan for
future evacuations; sign up for emergency alerts; clear
the roof, deck, and gutters of pine needles and other
debris; remove flammable debris from foundation of
home and deck; or dispose of dead fuel accumulation
on the property. Respondents don’t view themselves
as capable of undertaking these actions, which could
be due to a variety of factors. Two of these actions
involve preparing for future wildfire evacuations.
Respondents may not feel capable of completing these
given the short period of time in which the survey was
received (i.e., 3 months after the fire). The negative
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feelings or memories associated with the fire may
have been fresh in their minds, causing them to not
want to imagine another fire where they have to plan
to evacuate. Self-efficacy was also not a significant
predictor of three vegetative mitigation actions. In this
case, our average respondent age may be contributing
to the view that they are capable of clearing the roof,
deck, and gutters of flammable debris, or removing
flammable debris from the foundation. These actions
may be too physically demanding or impossible
for some respondents, which would explain the
nonsignificant finding. Some respondents may create
a list of mitigation actions they plan to complete each
spring but run out of time when the fire season begins.
This would make sense given ‘lack of time’ was the
strongest barrier to mitigation both pre-416 and post416 fire. In addition, the action ‘dispose of dead fuel
accumulation on property’ requires a truck or other
large equipment, which two respondents pointed out
in the open-ended text at the end of the survey. These
respondents indicated that they were able to thin and
prune the trees and brush but had no way of removing
it since they do not own a truck. Incentive programs
could be structured with these considerations in mind,
and options should be provided to individuals with
different barriers and different needs. For instance,
those who are able to thin and prune vegetation could
participate in a voluntary debris removal program.
Those who are unable to physically participate in
thinning and pruning could participate in a voluntary
labor for mitigation program. These programs exist in
La Plata county, however they may not be reaching
individuals due to lack of awareness.

Conclusion
Collectively, this research offers new insights into why
individuals take specific wildfire mitigation behaviors.
Our investigation also revealed that the 416 wildfire
served as ‘wake-up call’ for residents in the Animas
Valley. For all of the mitigation behaviors we asked
about, there was a significant increase in intentions
to take those behaviors after the wildfire. These
results suggest that experiences with the 416 wildfire
are pushing residents to engage in more personal
preparedness measures in the case of an evacuation
(e.g., create an evacuation plan, pack an emergency
evacuation bag) as well as structural and vegetative
mitigation (e.g., removing flammable debris, etc.).

Grounding our investigation in Protection Motivation
Theory, we were able to determine that response
efficacy was as significant predictor of several planed
mitigation actions. However, response efficacy was
not a significant predictor of: clearing the roof, deck,
and gutters of pine needles and other debris; removing
flammable debris from the foundation of home or
deck, disposing of dead fuel accumulation on the
property, or thinning and pruning trees and shrubs
within 30 ft. of the home. This means that respondents
view these actions as less effective or ineffective at
reducing their risk to wildfire damage. Future efforts
should be made to emphasize the effectiveness of
these actions.
Local, regional, and state planners can take the findings
from this study into consideration when designing
and implementing outreach and education campaigns
intended to increase the proactive mitigation
behaviors amongst residents living in high-risk areas of
the wildland urban interface.
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